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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

DENNIS D. BEDA

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 950466-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant, Dennis D. Beda, appeals his conviction for
witness tampering, a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (1995)(R. 72). This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) (Supp.
1995) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Has defendant established that he was denied his right
to conflict-free counsel?

This claim presents a question of

law reviewed on the trial record because defendant raises it
for the first time on direct appeal without a prior

evidentiary hearing.

State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 175

(Utah App. 1992).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Addendum A contains the text of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8508 (1995), and rule 3.7, Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with witness tampering, a
third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 76-8-508
(1995) (R. 1). The jury convicted defendant of the charged
crime (R. 26). The trial court sentenced defendant to the
statutory prison term of zero-to-five years (R. 72).
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal (R. 75).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the course of an unspecified extended investigation,
police went to defendant's residential hotel room on July
26, 1994 (R. 168, 206-207).

The officers discovered D.A., a

sixteen-year-old boy, in the room (R. 106, 169) . D.A. told
the officers that defendant had given him alcohol, and they
arrested defendant for supplying alcohol to a minor (R. 1702

71, 206-207).
Prior to trial on the alcohol charge, defendant met
with D.A. and prevailed on D.A. to change his statement to
exonerate defendant (R. 119-22, 133, 178). Defendant told
D.A. that, if D.A. did not recant, defendant would have to
spend a year in prison; that defendant would pay any fine
D.A. received as a result of changing his statement; and
that he would pay for D.A.'s car insurance and license
plates (R. 123, 129-30).
After that conversation, defendant took D.A. to visit
two attorneys to discuss the possible consequences to D.A.
if he changed his story to exonerate defendant of providing
him with alcohol (R. 124-26, 147, 191, 202-203).
Ultimately, defendant took D.A. to Melissa Whetton, the
Weber County Public Defender Association secretary, who
typed a new statement recanting D.A.'s previous accusations
(R. 212-13).
On the morning of the trial for the alcohol charge,
D.A. produced the written statement denying that defendant
had provided him with alcohol (R. 176-77).
3

Detective Miner

(one of the investigating police officers), D.A., and D.A.'s
mother were all present when D.A. gave the written
recantation to his trial counsel, Mr. John Caine, and
verbally denied that defendant provided him with alcohol (R.
150-51, 176, 183-84).
Detective Miner immediately terminated the meeting,
took D.A. and D.A.'s mother to his office, and asked D.A.
why he had changed his story (R. 177, 185-86).

D.A. then

admitted that defendant had persuaded him to deny that
defendant had provided alcohol to him (R. 133, 178).
Prior to the trial in this case, defendant filed a pro
se motion to remove Mr. Caine from the case, contending that
Mr. Caine needed to testify about D.A.'s statements and
demeanor at the oral recantation, D.A.'s physical condition
at the preliminary hearing, and D.A.'s demeanor at other
times he changed his testimony (R. 11-15).

After a hearing,

the trial court granted defendant's motion and appointed
another attorney to represent him (R. 246-48).x

defendant represents that the trial court *found as a
matter of fact, that there was a conflict because Mr. Caine was a
potential defense witness." Appellant's Brief at 9. Defendant
4

Mr. Caine then appeared with defendant at defendant's
arraignment (R. 250). Defendant told the trial court that
the parties had resolved the issue about Mr. Caine
testifying by use of a stipulation that D.A. made a
statement recanting his prior accusation that defendant
provided D.A. with alcohol (R. 251). The trial court then
asked defendant if he was comfortable with Mr. Caine
representing him; defendant stated that he was (id.).

When

the trial court asked defendant whether he believed any
conflict no longer existed, defendant responded that Mr.
Caine had informed him that the parties would enter into
stipulations (id.).

Defendant never again suggested that

Mr. Caine should withdraw to testify until after the jury
convicted him and he filed his appeal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant has not established that his trial counsel:
1) actively represented an interest in conflict with his
own; 2) that any conflict adversely affected his counsel's

includes no record citation to support this representation, and
the State located no such finding by the trial court.
5

performance; or 3) that he lacked sufficient information to
make a knowing waiver of any conflict.

Each failure

independently defeats defendant's appellate claims.
Defendant has not identified what conflicting interest
his counsel actively represented.

Instead, he contends only

that trial counsel became a necessary witness and should
therefore have withdrawn to testify on defendant's behalf.
This argument fails for two reasons.

First, even if trial

counsel became a necessary witness, his decision not to
testify may establish, at most, a poor strategic decision
unless defendant establishes that counsel made the decision
to promote a personal interest over defendant's interests.
The record contains no evidence of a personal interest.
Second, defendant has not established that his trial
counsel was a necessary or even a desirable witness. All of
the testimony defendant contends his counsel could have
offered concerned matters that the State did not dispute,
about which his counsel had no knowledge, or on which his
counsel could have offered no crucial testimony.

Similarly,

the record contains no evidence of the testimony trial
6

counsel would have given; his testimony may have actually
helped the State's case.

Therefore, this record fails to

establish that trial counsel was a necessary witness.
Defendant also has not established any adverse affect
on counsel's performance.

To the contrary, the record

demonstrates that counsel's decision not to withdraw and
testify resulted from legitimate strategic decisions.
Finally, the record demonstrates that defendant had
sufficient information to make a knowing waiver of any
conflict.

In a pre-trial pro se motion, defendant

successfully had his trial counsel removed and new counsel
appointed so that his trial counsel could testify.
Defendant later agreed that his need for trial counsel's
testimony could be met by other means and agreed to trial
counsel's continued representation.

Defendant's pro se

motion and discussion with the Court when trial counsel
resumed the representation demonstrated that he had
sufficient information to waive his right to conflict-free
counsel.

7

ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT HAS SHOWN NEITHER THAT HIS COUNSEL
ACTIVELY REPRESENTED CONFLICTING INTERESTS, NOR
THAT ANY CONFLICT ADVERSELY AFFECTED HIS COUNSEL'S
PERFORMANCE; ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY
CONFLICT
Defendant contends that he was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to conflict-free counsel because his trial
counsel, Mr. John Caine, was a necessary witness.
Appellant's Brief at 11-13.

Defendant also admits that he

waived the conflict, but contests the validity of that
waiver.

Appellant's Brief at 9-11.

In order to establish a denial of his right to
conflict-free counsel, defendant must establish both of the
following: 1) that Mr. Caine actively represented
conflicting interests; and 2) that the conflict adversely
affected Mr. Caine's performance.

See, e.g.. Gardner v.

Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 620 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, lie
S.Ct. 97 (1995); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 73 (Utah 1990).
If defendant can establish both elements, he need not show
that counsel's performance undermines confidence in the
outcome.

Id.

However, defendant must "point to specific

8

instances in the record to suggest an actual conflict or
impairment of his or her interests. . . . There is no
violation where the conflict is irrelevant or merely
hypothetical . . . ."

State v. Webb. 790 P.2d at 75.

A defendant can waive his right to conflict-free
counsel.
1991).

State v. Johnson. 823 P.2d 484, 490 (Utah App.

The waiver's validity turns on whether defendant had

enough infonnation about the possible consequences of the
waiver.

Id. at 490-91.

Defendant has not established: 1) that Mr. Caine
actively represented conflicting interests; 2) that any
conflict adversely affected Mr. Caine's performance; or 3)
that defendant lacked sufficient information about the
consequences of waiving any conflict to make a valid waiver.
Any one of these failures independently defeats his
appellate claim.
A.

Defendant has not shown what conflicting interest
Mr. Caine represented.

Defendant assumes that Mr. Caine had a conflict of
interest because he became a ^necessary witness."

9

Appellant's Brief at 11-12.

For support, defendant cites

the ethical rule prohibiting counsel from appearing as an
advocate in a trial where he "is likely to be a necessary
witness.'' Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7.

Defendant

correctly acknowledges that violating an ethical rule does
not necessarily establish counsel's ineffectiveness.
Appellant's Brief at 12.

See id. at 489 (the Court may use

the rules to examine counsel's conduct, but a violation does
not create a presumption of a breach of a legal duty).
Nevertheless, defendant relies solely on a purported
violation of rule 3.7 to support his claim the Mr. Caine had
an actual conflict of interest.
Defendant's argument fails for two reasons.

First,

even if Mr. Caine had been a necessary witness, and
therefore should have withdrawn under rule 3.7, his failure
to do so does not, by itself, establish a conflict that
renders counsel's performance ineffective for Sixth
Amendment purposes.
Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free
counsel guarantees him counsel who will pursue his interests
10

over those of anyone else.

See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.

335, 349-51 (1980) (giving an example of counsel
representing multiple client's and promoting one client's
interests to the detriment of the other's interests).

This

Court has recognized that a conflict violating defendant's
right to conflict-free counsel may arise where counsel
represents multiple defendants with conflicting interests,
or where counsel's personal interests conflict with
defendant's.

See. State v. Johnson. 823 P.2d at 488-90.

In

Johnson. for example, this Court found that counsel's
interest in exonerating himself from the same crime with
which the State had charged his client conflicted with
defending his client.

Id. at 490.

Defendant has not shown, and on this record cannot
show, that Mr. Caine served a conflicting interest of his
own or of another client's by not testifying.

Defendant may

have shown such a conflict if, for example, the Weber County
Public Defender's Association paid Mr. Caine on a per case
basis.

A conflict may then exist because Mr. Caine may

refuse to withdraw and testify in order to further his
11

personal pecuniary interests.

However, if the association

pays Mr. Caine a flat fee regardless of the number of
defendants he represents, he would have no personal interest
in refusing to withdraw.

If counsel's decision not to

testify did not result from a personal interest in conflict
with defendant's, that decision may, at most, establish a
questionable strategic decision, but not that he served
conflicting interests.
Second, and more importantly, the record does not
support defendant's underlying factual premise: this record
does not establish that Mr. Caine was a necessary or even a
desirable witness for defendant.

In Gardner v. Holden. the

Utah Supreme Court considered when a lawyer "ought to be
called as a witness" under the predecessor to rule 3.7.
Gardner v. Holden. 888 P.2d at 621.

In that case, Gardner's

attorneys could have added nothing to support Mr. Gardner's
defense; therefore, the court concluded that *[a]1though
[Gardner's attorneys] were 'potential' witnesses, they were
not material witnesses, and nothing in the record indicates
that they ought to have been called as witnesses."
12

Id.

(emphasis in original).
Gardner controls this case.

Defendant contends that

Mr. Caine would have testified: 1) that D.A. recanted his
statement accusing defendant of providing D.A. with alcohol;
2) that defendant was not present when D.A. recanted; 3)
what D.A.'s demeanor was at the time he recanted; and 4)
that D.A. was evasive at the preliminary hearing.
Appellant's Brief at 11-12.

The State did not dispute that

D.A. recanted his earlier statement: that recantation formed
the basis for the witness-tampering charge.

Moreover, other

witnesses, including D.A.# testified that D.A. had recanted
his accusation that defendant provided him with alcohol (R.
121, 127-30, 133, 149, 174-77).
Mr. Caine could not have testified that defendant was
absent when D.A. first recanted because he first recanted in
a written statement typed by the Weber County Defender's
Association's secretary outside of Mr. Caine's presence (R.
213).

Moreover, the evidence clearly established that

defendant was not present when D.A. orally recanted on the
morning of trial, and the State did not contend otherwise.
13

Other witnesses identified who attended the meeting where
D.A. made his oral recantation; none stated that defendant
was present (R. 150, 176).
Defendant's theory also rendered Mr. Caine's testimony
about D.A.'s demeanor on any given occasion irrelevant.
Defendant did not contend that D.A. told the truth when he
gave his single recantation and lied on the multiple
occasions he accused defendant of providing him with
alcohol.

Mr. Caine focused on the number of different

stories D.A. gave, pointed out that there was no dispute
that D.A. had lied, and reminded the jury that D.A. had
changed his story yet again while testifying at the trial
(R. 220-24).

Mr. Caine then contended that, because it was

impossible to tell when D.A. told the truth and because D.A.
provided the only direct witness-tampering evidence, the
State had not met its burden to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt (R. 221, 224-25).

Testimony about D.A.'s

demeanor while giving one version of the events had no
relevance to this theory. Because that line of defense
rendered evidence of defendant's demeanor irrelevant, Mr.
14

Caine was not a necessary witness.
Alternatively, defendant has not established on this
record that Mr. Caine had crucial testimony to give
concerning D.A.'s demeanor.

To the contrary, the record

contains no evidence of what Mr. Caine would have stated
about D.A.'s demeanor.

Mr. Caine may have considered D.A.'s

demeanor evasive when he orally recanted.

That testimony

would have bolstered the State's claim that defendant
induced D.A. to lie for him. Similarly, he may have
considered D.A. evasive both at the oral recantation and at
the preliminary hearing, which would have offered no help in
determining on which occasion D.A. told the truth. See
Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d at 621 (defendant not harmed by
counsel's decision not to testify where counsel's testimony
would not have advanced his defense).
Because the existing record contains no evidence of a
conflicting interest that Mr. Caine may have served by not
testifying and demonstrates that Mr. Caine was not a
necessary witness, defendant has established an actual
conflict of interest between Mr. Caine and himself.
15

B.

The record precludes concluding that anv conflict
adversely affected Mr. Caine's performance.

In addition to establishing that an actual conflict
existed, defendant must also establish that the conflict
adversely affected his counsel's performance,

gtate v.

Webb. 790 P.2d at 76. Although not entirely clear,
defendant presumably contends that Mr. Caine's decision not
to testify is the adverse effect.
In order to determine whether Mr. Caine's decision
adversely affected defendant, this Court considers whether
other counsel would have chosen to testify, and whether a
tactical reason exists for the decision.

Id.

This record

affirmatively establishes that Mr. Caine's decision arose
from legitimate strategic choices.
As established in the preceding argument, many of the
facts about which defendant claims Mr. Caine could testify
were undisputed, were established by other witnesses, or
were outside of Mr. Caine's knowledge.

Therefore, Mr. Caine

legitimately chose not to testify about those facts.

See

Gardner v. Holden. 888 P.2d at 621 (Gardner not harmed by

16

counsel's decision not to testify because counsel could
offer no helpful testimony).
Also as established in the preceding argument,
defendant's theory made any defense testimony about D.A.'s
demeanor on any given occasion irrelevant.

Given the number

of different stories D.A. told, this theory was the best
that defendant could offer the jury: it was more plausible
then attempting to establish that D.A. told the truth only
in his single recantation.

Therefore, Mr. Caine's decision

to follow it was not only a legitimate tactical decision,
but the best tactical decision he could have made. See
State v. Webb. 790 P.2d at 76-77 (finding no adverse affect
from multiple representation where decision to present a
unified defense was not only legitimate, but the only
reasonable defense available).
Alternatively, the record does not establish that
defense counsel could have offered any testimony helpful to
defendant.

Therefore, this record does not support

defendant's argument that Mr. Caine should have withdrawn in
order to testify about D.A.'s demeanor.
17

Because the record establishes that Mr. Caine's
decisions were legitimate strategic decisions, defendant has
shown no adverse affect on Mr. Caine's performance.
v. Webb, 790 P.2d at 76-77.

State

That failure independently

defeats his claim that he was denied his right to conflictfree counsel.2
C.

Defendant had sufficient information to waive his

right to conflict-free counsel.
Although he acknowledges that he waived any conflict,
defendant challenges the waiver's validity because: 1) the
trial court did not go into sufficient detail about the
consequences of the waiver; and 2) he did not consult with
independent counsel before waiving the conflict.
Appellant's Brief at 10-11.
A defendant can waive his right to conflict-free
2

Without establishing an actual conflict that adversely
affected his counsel's performance, defendant can succeed on his
ineffectiveness claim only by identifying specific acts or
omissions that fall below objective reasonability and that those
acts or omissions undermine confidence in the outcome.
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 690, 694 (1984);
Parsons V, Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521-22 (Utah), cert, denied. 115
S.Ct. 431 (1994). For the reasons just argued, counsel's
decision not to testify constituted a legitimate strategic
decision. Defendant has not even argued that counsel's
performance undermines confidence in the outcome.
18

counsel if he has enough information about the possible
consequences of the waiver.

State v. Johnson. 823 P.2d at

490-91.
The record clearly establishes that defendant knew the
rights he waived.

In his pro se motion, defendant

articulated for the trial court the testimony he sought from
Mr. Caine, then agreed that a stipulation that D.A. changed
his story satisfied his interests in having Mr. Caine
testify (R. 11-15, 246-48, 250-52).

Therefore, defendant's

own motion establishes that he had sufficient information to
make a valid waiver.
Defendant contends that wthe trial court did not go
into any detail to advise [defendant] of the consequences he
would suffer by waiving his right to conflict free counsel."
Appellant's Brief at 10-11.
trial court must give

w%

Johnson does state that the

an adequate warning of the potential

hazards posed by the conflict of interest and of the
accused's right to other counsel.'"
P.2d at 491 (citation omitted).

State v. Johnson. 823

In this case, defendant

clearly new the hazards posed by the waiver: if Mr. Caine
19

continued to represent him, Mr. Caine could not testify.
Before waiving his rights, defendant successfully moved to
remove Mr. Caine for this reason.

Similarly, defendant

clearly knew that he had a right to another attorney: he
succeeded in obtaining another attorney before changing his
mind and requesting that Mr. Caine resume representing him.
Because defendant demonstrated to the trial court that he
knew the rights he was waiving, no additional warning by or
inquiry from the trial court was necessary.
Finally, defendant contends that he could not validly
waive the conflict without first consulting with independent
counsel.

Defendant cites no case authority to support his

contention; that failure alone precludes considering it on

the merits.

See, eT&t/ State Vt Amicone, 689 p.2d 1341,

1344 (Utah 1984)(refusing to consider a issue that Amicone
supported with no legal authority or analysis).

Moreover,

other jurisdictions have refused to make consultation with
independent counsel about a possible conflict an absolute
prerequisite to making a valid waiver.

See, e.g.. United

States v. Rodriguez. 968 F.2d 130, 139 (2nd Cir.) (although
20

consultation with independent counsel may be preferable,
absence of such consultation does not invalidate waiver if
there is no sign that defendant did not understand what he
was doing), cert, denied. 506 U.S. 847, 113 S. Ct. 140, 506
U.S. 1023 (1992); State v. Keezer. 918 S.W.2d 874, 878 (Mo.
App. E.D. 1996) (declining to mandate use of independent
counsel); State v. Williams. 523 A.2d 1284, 1293 (Conn.
1987) (trial court's failure to point out option of
consulting with independent counsel did not invalidate
waiver under circumstances of that case).

Finally, as noted

above, defendant clearly understood the scope of the rights
he waived; therefore, independent counsel's advice about the
waiver would have proven a superfluous step.
This Court recognized in Johnson the potential for a
defendant to manipulate a waiver to his advantage.

State v.

Johnson. 888 P.2d at 491. Defendant attempts to do just
that.

Defendant knew his rights and waived them.

He did

not again suggest during trial that Mr. Caine should
withdraw so that Mr. Caine could testify, waiting to reraise that argument only after the jury convicted him and he
21

filed his appeal.

Defendant successfully had Mr. Caine

removed, then agreed to allow Mr. Caine to represent him; he
did not change this position until after he lost.
Therefore, defendant is attempting to manipulate the waiver
to obtain a second trial.
such manipulation."

The Court should unot condone

Id.

In sum, defendant has not established that Mr. Caine
actively represented an interest that conflicted with his
own.

Furthermore, the record affirmatively establishes that

Mr. Caine's decision not to testify arose from legitimate
strategic concerns; therefore, the record establishes that,
if a conflicting interest existed, it did not adversely
affect Mr. Caine's performance.

Finally, defendant had

sufficient information to waive his rights to conflict free
counsel.

Any one of the above defeats defendant's appeal.
CONCLUSION

Based on the above, the State asks the Court to affirm
defendant's conviction.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The State requests oral argument to answer any
22

questions or concerns the Court may have.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

ZL '

day of August

/11C
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
__y f^cn-^^ea4

tS-^-crT-^^l

THOMAS BRUNKER
Assistant Attorney General
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Kent E. Snider
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 102
Ogden, Utah 84401
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ADDENDUM

OFFENSES AGAINST ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT

76-8-510

76-8-609. Extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding.
(1) A person is guilty of a felony of the second degree if by the use offeree or
by any threat which would constitute a means of committing the crime of theft
by extortion under this code, if the threat were employed to obtain property, or
by promise of any reward or pecuniary benefits, he attempts to induce an
alleged .victim of a crime to secure the dismissal of or to prevent the filing of a
criminal complaint, indictment, or information.
(2) •Victim," as used in this section, includes a child or other person under
the care or custody of a parent or guardian.
History: C. 1958,76-8-509, enacted by L. bribery, to prevent criminal prosecution, | 761973, ch. 196, t 76-8-509.
S408.
Croee-Referencee. — Accepting bribe, or
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jor. 3d. — 31A Am. Jur. 2d Extortion,
Blackmail, and Threat* { 50.
CJS. — 86 CJJS. Threats and Unlawful
Communications { 4.

AJL1L~ Criminal liability of corporation for
extortion, false pretenaee, or timilar offense, 49
A.L.R3d 820.
Key Numbers. — Threats • » 1(1).

76-8-510. Tampering with evidence.
A person commits a felony of the second degree if, believing that an official
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he:
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything with a purpose to
impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation; or
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything which he knows to be false with
a purpose to deceive a public servant who is or may be engaged in a
proceeding or investigation.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-510, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 196,1 7 6 * 5 1 0 .
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

....
Knaenee.
—AdxmsaibUity.
""S2^a 4
—Sufficient
Evident*.
—Admissibility.
Defendant's swallowing a bag that the police
had taken into custody impaired the availabilityofthat evidence for any resulting proceeding
or investigation irrespective of its admissibility
against defendant at trial. State v. Wagstaff;
646 R2d 1311 (Utah Ct App. 1993).

evidence of guilt was so slight, so conflicting,
and so inherently improbable that reasonable
^ ^ ^ ^4 n o t ^yt concluded that defendant
rejected a fire investigation report in an att e m t to
P
•**«• destroy, conceal or remove it to
impair its verity or availability, rather than
rejecting it because it was a "bad report" State
v. Herman, 767 P.2d 567 (Utah Ct App. 19S9).

—*"Sletan!' A
, . _ , _ * ,
Evidence that a police officer had intention• ^ manipulated a breathalyzer machine in
« * * . * o b u i n * « • • Jading was sufficient to
sojtam a eounehai for tampenng-with^evidenoe Sut
- * * ^ ^ 7 0 1 R 2 d 4 9 6 (Vtah 1986 >Evidence was sufficientforjury to conclude
—Insufficient.
that defendant knowingly or intentionally atDefendant's conviction of attempted tamper tempted to induce a fire marshal to withhold a
ing with evidence was reversed, because the report on afirefroman official investigation or
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KULES OF PE0FE8SI0NAL CONDUCT

RuleS.7

COMMENT
legitimate interest fa the conduct af judicial
prooeedinga, particularly in matters of general
public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceeding! ia often of direct eignifleance in debate and deliberation ever questkme of public policy.
-No body of rake can efinnhaneonely satisfy
all fataraata of fcir trial and all thcae of xrae
«xpreesioxL The formula in this Bole ia baaed
upon the Code of Prcrfaeaional Booponsibilifr
and the ABA Standards Relating to Pair Trial
and Free Preea, as amended in 1078.
special mice of confidentiality may validly
gorero prooeedinga in juvenile, domestic relatione and mental disability prooeedinga, and
parbape other typee of litigation Sola &4(e)
raquirae compliance with such Sake.

It if difficult to atrika a balanoa batwaan prodding tha right to a frir trial and seJeguardfc|(1w • Ijjlil lirfm iijiiaaiiliMi riaaanlim Ilia
tight to a fur trial neoaeaarily ontailf acme
CBrtaihnent of tha information that may ba diefminatad about a party prior to trial, partial*
fcrfy whara trial by Jury k involved. If thara
vera ao such iimita, tha raauh would ba tha
practical nullification of tha protective eflect of
tbi rales of forensic daconnn and tha a d o *
#onary rolaa of evidence. On tha other hand,
thara are vital aodal intaraata aanrad by the
ftee diaeenxination of information about events
taring legal eonaaqoanoai and about legal proseartinp themsshrea The jmhTir hai a tight In
know about thraate to ita eafety and tnaaanrae
timed at aaearing to security. It aleo haa a

CODE COMPARISON
proridad that a lawyer may vrreal •WJt the
time of oeisure, a deecription of the phyaical
evidence oeised, other than a confe—Ion, admiaaion or statement* Such rarelatione may
ba aubatantially prejudicial and are frequently
the subject of pretrial suppression motions,
which, if successful, may be circumvented by
ptar disclosure to the

Bole 8.6 ie aimilar to DB 7*107, except aa
fellows: First, Role 8.6 adopts the general criteria of •Substantial likelihood of materially
InfliiTwtwy as adjudicative proceeding" to describe Impermissible eonduct Second, Rule 8.6
fcansfbrms the particolare in DB 7*107 into an
Illustrative compilation that ghrae mir notice
ef conduct ordinarily posing unacceptable danger! to the fair administration of justice.
Knaify, Rule &6 omita DB 7*107(0(7), which

NOTES TO DECISIONS
trial, In violation of this rule's alleged public
policy againat pre-trial publicity, wai reacted.
The Utah Bulee of Profeeaional Conduct govarn the professional and ethical conduct of lawyere, not what constitutes good oauee for induaion or releaae of documents within a protective order. Orundberg •. Upjohn Co., 187
F.RD. 872 CD. Utah 1991).

AKALTBD

Frotecbvo order.
—Releaae o/doeumanta.
Protective order.
—Releaae ef doeumanta.
The defendant*a contention that releaae of
certain doeumanta from the tarma of a protective order necoeesrify would raauh in an unfair

Eule 3.7. Lawyer as Witness.
(a) A lawyer shall not met aa advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is
likely to be a necessary witneaa except where:
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services
rendered in the case; or
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on
the client.
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in the trial in which another lawyer in
the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded fitpn
doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule IS.
COMMENT
Combining the rolee of advocate and witneea
can prejudice the opposing party and can invoire a conflict of interest between the lawyer
and client
The opposing party fcaa proper ejection
where the combination of rolee may prejudice
Oat party's right* in the litigation. A witneea
is required to testify on the oasis of peraonal
knowledge, while an advocate ia expected to
explain and comment on evidence given by
other*. It may not be clear whether a state-

ment by an advocate-witness ahonld ba taken
aa proof or as an analysis of the proof
Paragraph (aXl) recognizee that if the teetimony will be uncontested, the ambiguities in
-the dual role are purely theoretical. Paragraph
<aX2) recognizee that where the testimony con*
jcerai the extent and value of legal eervieee
rendered in the action in which the testimony
Ie offered, permitting the lawyer to testify
avoids the need for a aecond trial with new
counael to reeohre that iasue1. Moreover, in such

ffaile£.8

C)ODPOF#UDIGIALADMrNISTEATION

aito«tioii,ti^jTidfthMftpfthandknawkdgt
af tht matter in tea*; hence, there ii let* dependence an tilt ailvtiauy prooeot to tost tfat
oa edibility of tht ttsHiiiflny.
•Apartfromthcee two axceptians, paragraph
<aXS) leeogzriset that a haltnring it laqohad
between tfat interests af the diant and thoae of
Ifat apposing party. Whether the appoaing
party it likely to suffer prejudice depeadj on
41M nature of tht oate, tilt tmportafmo and
frohtble ttnor af tht lawyer's ttttimony, and
tilt probability that tht lawyer's ttttimony
ariB conflict with that of ether aUuostM Ertn
if thart it ritk of aoeh prejudice, 4a determining whtthtr tilt lawyar thouH be ditquslifitd,
this ragani mutt be given to tht effect of ditjqnjdificttion on tht lawyer's diant It it rtleitant that one or both partita could rtatonably
i that tht lawyar would probtbly bt a

VM

Tht principle of imputed ditqaihfiet.
Hon atattd in Bale UO hat no fTa*'Ttinn ID
thit atptet af the problem,
Whether tht ownhinttinn of role* tunkm
an improper conflict of inttratt with respect t»
the client it determined by Bole L7 or U. Par
asarnple, if there it likely to be -tomtit]
conflict between tht testimony of tht cheat tad
that of tilt lawyar or a number of the lawjw/i
tenths lofffoatntetinn It improper. Tht ptob»
Jam oan ariat whtthtr tht lawyar it culled ti t
witness on behalf of tht client or it called by
tht canting forty. Determining whtthtr tr
act ouch a conflict exist* it primarily the ie.
•epmMfbflity of tfat lawyar tnrohrod. Bet Comm a t to Bole 1.7. If a lawyar who it a member
af a firm may not act at both advocate aal
wftnsai by reaton of conflict of interact, Bolt
1.10 ditqnaliflet tht firm alto.

CODE COMPARISON
WL M02CA) prohibited a lawyar, or the lawpartfan,fromtarring at advocate if tht lawyer learned or it it obvious that he or a lawyar
in hitfirmought to bt called at a witnttj on
behalf of hi* diant" DR 6402(B) provided that
a lawyar, and tht lawyartfirm,may continue
trapraatntation if tht lawyer leant or it it obvious that ht or a lawyar infaitfirmmay bt
called at a witntat other than on behalf of his
client.. • tmta it it apparent that his testimony
It or may bt prejudicial to hie diant" DR
M01CB) permitted a lawyar to testify while
rtjii ttiiiti \\g a client: t l ) If tht testimony will
folate solely to an uncontested matter, (2) If
tilt testimony will relate solely to a matter of

formality and there it no reason to believe thst
substantial evidence wQl be offered in opposition to tht testimony, (8) If the testimony wffl
folate solely to tht nature and value of legal
services rendered in the east hy tht lawyer or
hisfirmto tht diant; (4) As to any matter If
refusal would work a substantial hardship on
tilt client because of the distinctive value of
the lawyar ar hitfirmas counsel in the partioalar cast."
3he exception stated in paragraph (aXl) consolidates provisions of DR 6-101CBXD and QD.
Tsstixnony relating to formality, referred to m
DR M01CBX2), in effect defined the pares*
•uncontested issue," and was redundant

NOTESTODECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Lawyar tsproocTiting himself
Need must be onmpelUng.
Lawyar representing himself.
Tht prohibition of thit rule against an advoatte testifying as a witness does not apply to an
attorney representing himself as a litigant in a
cast. Beckftead v. Dessist Roofing Co., 831
PJd ISO (Utah Ct 4pp. 1992).

riead avast bt compelling'
It is generally inadvisable fa a member af
the bar to testify in litigation in which he or
ahe personally represents a party. The need far
the ttttimony of counsel must be ^impelling
and must be necessary to preserve the cause of
action. Watidss k Campbell v. Foa * Son, 806
F.2d 1061 (Utah 1991).

Rule 3*8. Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor.
The proaecutor in a criminal ease shall:
(a) Refrainfromprosecuting a charge that the proaecutor knows is not
•imported by probable cause;
(b) Make reasonable efforts to aaaure that the accused has been advised
of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been
given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
(c) Not seek to obtainfroman unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing;
(d) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the
defense all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor,
except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility py a protective order of the tribunal; and
(e) Exercise reasonable care to prevent Investigators, law enforcement
personnel/employees or other j>ersons'assisting or associated with the

